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Abstract 2008 was marked by the tenth anniversary of the Asian crisis and the
debate over how to reform the international financial architecture but also by the
outbreak of the most serious global credit crisis in generations. This paper reviews
the debate over how to strengthen the international monetary and financial system in
this light.
1 Introduction
The Asian crisis was a shock to the countries at its epicenter and more generally to
the international economic and financial system. One result was a debate on how to
adapt policy in emerging economies and strengthen international financial markets.
Contributors to the literature on what came to be called reforming the international
financial architecture quickly sorted themselves into two camps.1 The first offered
proposals for radically reshaping the international system. The second, less
ambitiously, emphasized the need for limited policy adaptations, mainly in emerging
economies, and for even more limited changes in the structure and governance of
international financial markets. In the end it was that second approach that carried
the day.
The global credit crisis of 2008 places both the assumptions underpinning that
earlier exercise and its achievements in a new light. The presumption, reflecting the
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fact that the 1997–8 crisis hit emerging markets but not the U.S. or Europe, was
emerging markets should emulate the advanced countries. They should build
securities markets like those in the advanced countries. They should regulate their
banks in the manner of the advanced countries. More generally, when determining
how to reform domestic monetary and financial arrangements, they should look to
the high-income world.
The 2008 crisis clearly shattered this presumption. It revealed the inadequacy of
transparency in the high-income countries. It laid bare the inadequacy of supervision
and regulation, failures in the coordination of macroeconomic and regulatory
policies, the pervasiveness of regulatory arbitrage, and incentive problems associated
with compensation practices in the financial-services industry. It dissolved any
notion that prevailing practice in the high-income countries is an appropriate
standard for emerging markets. But it offered little guidance as to what other
standard to put in its place.
Another product of the crisis was a second round of calls for a new international
financial architecture. These came from Gordon Brown, were echoed by Nicolas
Sarkozy, and were embraced by George W. Bush. Here, however, calls to action
were not accompanied by details. It was not clear whether leaders intended to
emulate their predecessors by proposing modest changes to the prevailing
architecture or whether they envisaged a more radical approach.
A new round of architecture discussions is clearly in the offing. Both to avoid
reinventing the wheel and prevent, predictable mistakes it may be helpful, therefore,
to understand the dynamics and limitations of the earlier exercise.
2 Changes in the international financial architecture anticipated in 1999
A decade ago mainstream reformers focused on strengthening supervision,
regulation, financial transparency and corporate governance through the adoption
of international standards and codes. Morris Goldstein had already proposed an
international standard for banking supervision and regulation (Goldstein 1997).
Subsequent contributions generalized this to a range of other policies and practices
related to financial stability. The idea was that standards and codes would
encapsulate best practice. They would offer concrete targets to which countries
could aspire. Compliance would constitute a visible indicator of what had been
achieved. Standards would provide a focus for market assessments of national
practice and apply peer pressure insofar as laggards experienced higher borrowing
costs. They would provide a focus for the surveillance activities of the International
Monetary Fund and perhaps also restrain its temptation to hold developing countries
to ever more demanding requirements.
Some dismissed standards as likely to be so general as to have little practical
effect. Others complained that standards with bite would be rigid and prescriptive;
they would end up foisting on emerging markets one-size-fits-all institutional
advice.2 Emerging markets would be instructed to dismantle bank- and family-led
systems of corporate control in favor of an Anglo-Saxon system emphasizing hostile
2 Notice the incompatibility of the two critiques.
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takeovers and proxy fights even when the functional prerequisites for the
effectiveness of the alternative were not in place. The IMF and other official bodies
charged with overseeing the new standards lacked expertise in auditing and
accounting practice, bank regulation, and insolvency procedures. More generally
there was skepticism that governments would feel significant pressure to upgrade
prevailing practice.
To be sure, the process of negotiating the new standards was long, complex and
arduous, and the results were less than ideal. To see this one need only recall that it
took nearly 10 years to update the existing Basel standard for capital adequacy for
internationally active banks which the recent crisis has shown to be deeply flawed.
The IMF found it difficult to marshal the resources needed to assess practices in
issue areas relatively far removed from the macroeconomic. It was reluctant to issue
blunt statements where compliance was inadequate. Governments refused to allow it
to undertake such reviews when they anticipated that the outcome would be
unfavorable.3
That said, there has been progress in the promulgation of standards and codes.
There are the aforementioned FSAPs organized jointly by the IMF and World Bank
and introduced in May 1999. These reviews of the condition of national financial
systems are undertaken with input from experts seconded from national agencies and
private-sector bodies as a way of addressing the problem of limited internal
resources. By-products of these assessments are Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Reports covering 12 areas, including auditing and
accounting, bank supervision, transparency, corporate governance, and insolvency
and creditor rights, are produced approximately every two years. In 1996 the IMF
had already targeted transparency and data dissemination by establishing the General
Data Dissemination System and the Special Data Dissemination Standard for
countries active on international capital markets. The SDDS lists 18 categories of
data covering four sectors of the economy and sets down standards for coverage,
timeliness, accuracy and public access. Participation is voluntary but highlighted by
the Fund’s SDDS Bulletin Board, which links to relevant national sources. There is
the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision which date
from 1997. The OECD, in conjunction with the Financial Stability Forum,
established principles for corporate governance in 1999.4 Official bodies have also
highlighted the standards promulgated by private groups such as the International
Federation of Accountants, International Accounting Standards Board and Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions.
The question is how much difference is made by these standards and codes.
Sundarajan, Marston and Basu (2001) report an effect of compliance with the Basel
Core Principles on financial stability outcomes. Christofides, Mulder and Tiffin
(2003) find that accounting standards, investor rights, and SDDS subscription matter
for spreads and credit ratings. Cady (2004) estimates that SDDS subscription reduces
3 Thus the IMF reportedly asked the United States to undergo a Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) prior to the outbreak of the subprime crisis, which the U.S. government rebuffed. The U.S. finally
agreed to an FSAP at the end of 2007 (Thomas and Munchetty 2008).
4 Since updated in 2004.
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spreads on new sovereign foreign currency bond issues by some 75 basis points.
Glennerster and Shin (2007) offer a similarly upbeat assessment, arguing that
subscribing to the SDSS and releasing information through publication of an Article
IV review and a ROSC reduces credit spreads significantly.5 Schneider’s (2005)
estimates are a bit smaller, but her results are broadly consistent with those of
Glennerster and Shin.
Other evidence is less reassuring. There is the flawed Basel II standard for capital
adequacy, two of whose pillars are banks’ internal models of value at risk and
commercial credit ratings for banks lacking internal models, both of which have
been shown to be insufficient for measuring risk.6 There is the OECD’s standard for
corporate governance, which has been shown by the crisis to be an inadequate basis
for limiting principal-agent problems and risk taking in the financial sector in
particular. There is the evidence of Tong (2007) and others that public information
made available through the SDDS discourages investment in private information.7
Common features of these problem areas include excessive confidence in market
discipline, acceptance of the premise that practice in the advanced countries is an
adequate standard for other countries, and the belief that markets always process and
assimilate information efficiently.
A second focus of the reform agenda was the nexus between banks, capital flows
and exchange rates. In the Asian crisis countries, banks were the weak links in the
financial chain. They suffered from lax internal controls, concentrated exposures,
and inadequate capital buffers. Banking crises in Asia, like banking crises elsewhere,
had devastating macroeconomic effects.
While there were some distinctive features of the Asian case, there were also
commonalities with other regions. The capital account of the balance of payments
having been at least partially opened, banks were able to fund themselves abroad,
generally at short tenors in foreign currency.8 Where loans were denominated in the
domestic currency, the result was a currency mismatch which could have disruptive
consequences when the exchange rate moved. Even where loans were denominated
in foreign currency, their tenor was longer than that of the banks’ foreign liabilities,
resulting in a maturity mismatch that could be equally disruptive if capital flows
turned around.9 These problems were extreme in the Asian crisis countries, but they
were not limited to the region.
The prevalence of these funding practices was attributed to the perception that
banks were too big and politically connected to fail, which encouraged risky
borrowing but also a willingness to lend on the part of foreign counterparties. Their
dominance reflected long-standing use of the banking system as an instrument of
6 I discuss both Basel II and the rating agencies at a greater length in Section 4 below.
7 Furman and Stiglitz (1998) similarly argue that transparency standards that reduce the dispersion of
beliefs across individuals may perversely amplify market volatility.
8 The role of this famous double mismatch in the Asian crisis was highlighted early on by Goldstein
(1998) and discussed further in Goldstein and Turner (2004).
9 We now see, as a result of the credit crisis in the advanced economies, that this maturity-mismatch
problem and excessive reliance on short-term (often foreign) funding is not limited to financial institutions
in emerging markets.
5 Indicative presumably of strengthened investor confidence.
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industrial policy. In other words, public-sector bailouts were the quid quo pro for the
banks directed lending. In cases such as Thailand and South Korea, opening to short-
term flows prior to opening to long-term flows aggravated the problem. In others,
failure to embrace greater exchange rate flexibility encouraged banks and firms to
leave their currency exposures unhedged. The devastating macroeconomic con-
sequences were similarly ascribed to a model of state-led late development that
privileged banking and left bond markets underdeveloped (Greenspan 1999).
Post-crisis reform focused on this nexus. This attempted to put banks on a firmer
commercial basis and limit the perception of too big to fail. In some countries—
South Korea for example—the crisis was followed by an unprecedented wave of
bank exits and takeovers. Between 1997 and early 2000 the number of Korean
commercial banks had fell from 26 to 7—an extraordinary development in a country
that had never in its history experienced the closure of a major financial institution.
More broadly, however, practice lagged principle.Moody’s (2007) describes the case
of Indonesia, where owing to lax corporate governance banks continue to lag their
regional peers in the implementation of international standards, although the standards
themselves are not obviously inferior to those of neighboring countries. Fitch’s
indicator of the health of national banking systems as of April 2008—that is, before
the spread of the credit crisis and global slowdown to emerging markets—gave ratings
of “weak” or “very weak” (D or E on an A-E scale) to almost 70% of emerging-
market banking systems. Half of all emerging-market systems are in the D category
and 20% were rated E. Only 11 received a B (“strong”) rating—Bahrain, Chile, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and
UAE—while only seven qualify for a C (“adequate”) rating—Brazil, Latvia, Malaysia,
Oman, Slovakia, Slovenia and Thailand. There is a preponderance of weak (D or E
rated) systems in every emerging region other than the Gulf Cooperation Council.
More fundamentally, there was an inadequate understanding of what constituted a
safe and sound banking system. Say what you will about the rating agencies, their
evaluations tend to accurately reflect the prevailing consensus in official circles.
Thus, the April 2008 report in question gave a rating of “strong” to South Korea’s
banking system, which required a massive government bailout six months later when
dollar funding dried up. Even more damningly, the rating agencies did not flag
serious vulnerabilities in the U.S. banking system in the first half of 2007. A
common feature here was failure to grasp the risks of excessive reliance on leverage
and wholesale funding.10 It was the naïve belief that privatization was enough to
convince bankers that they would not be bailed out in the future like they had been
in the past, where in fact private banks can be too big and connected to fail.
Another feature of the post-Asian-crisis architecture was a more measured
approach to capital account liberalization. The need was acknowledged by the IMF
as early as the spring of 1998.11 A series of subsequent staff studies and policy
10 There were other problems as well, of course, such as inadequate internal controls and regulatory
arbitrage (shifting high-risk exposures to conduits and structured investment vehicles). But that is a subject
for another paper.
11 Eichengreen and Mussa et al. (1998) emphasized the need for a more measured approach. This
synthesis was presented to the Executive Board in the spring of 1998, and its findings were reflected in the
associated board discussion and conclusions of the chair (IMF 1998).
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statements reiterated the desirability of capital account convertibility as a long-run
goal but emphasized preconditions for ensuring that the benefits outweighed the
costs.12 They warned that capital flows could be volatile and that countries should
avoid large current account deficits that heightened their dependence on foreign
funding. This was advice that emerging markets in Asia and, to a somewhat lesser
extent, Latin America took to heart: they shifted from current account deficit to
surplus and accumulated foreign reserves as protection against sudden stops.
The efficacy of this advice is evident in the current crisis. Countries running
current account surpluses, while far from immune, have avoided 1997–8 style crises,
while those running current account deficits have experienced grave difficulties as
funding for those deficits has dried up. Countries with ample reserves can avoid
sharply contractionary adjustments. They can intervene to stabilize their banking
systems insofar as foreign reserves exceed the decline in foreign finance.13
The problem is that not all countries were equally diligent at limiting capital
inflows and preventing deficits from widening. In Central and Eastern Europe,
countries that allowed very large external deficits to develop are now paying the
price. In part this was a problem of false confidence. The Baltics and other Eastern
European countries had not experienced an Asia-like crisis. They were under the
misapprehension that their capital inflows were stable, either because foreign banks
dominated the local market, intermediating those flows, or because their special
status as EU members would reassure investors. In the event they were disappointed.
The other problem was a dearth of instruments with which to manage flows.
Interest rate responses tend to be at best ineffectual, at worst perverse.14 Sterilization
is costly—even for China now that domestic interest rates exceed their U.S.
equivalents. Holding-period taxes can disturb investor confidence if applied with
anything but the greatest delicacy.15 The only instrument guaranteed to be effective is
fiscal policy. By raising public saving, governments can influence the saving/
investment balance. But doing so is difficult, especially in democratic societies where
decisions regarding taxation and public spending are dominated by other priorities.
Another focus of the post-Asian-crisis agenda was limiting currency and maturity
mismatches.16 This was to be achieved through strengthening supervision and
regulation of the banking system and by adopting more flexible exchange rates to
encourage hedging by firms and households.17 Here too progress is best described as
13 As in the case of Korea. The contrast is striking between Korea’s response to the last crisis, when it was
forced to raise interest rates in a desperate effort to re-attract flight capital, and this one, when it has been
able to avoid interest rate increases and instead work to re-liquify its banking system.
14 Raising interest rates to damp down the inflationary effects only tends to attract more capital inflows.
Lowering rates discourages inflows but stimulates domestic demand, similarly resulting in problems of
inflation and real overvaluation.
15 Recall how their imposition in Thailand in late 2006 led to a stock market crash.
16 See inter alia Goldstein and Turner (2004).
17 Empirical studies (e.g. Duttagupta, Fernandez, and Karasadag 2004) suggest that the shift toward more
flexible exchange rates has contributed to the development of deeper and more liquid hedging markets and
encouraged banks and firms to better hedge their foreign currency exposures.
12 See inter alia Prasad, Rumbaugh and Wang (2005), Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006) and Prasad
and Rajan (2008a, b).
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mixed. In Eastern Europe, regulators prevented banks from incurring currency
mismatches but did not prevent them from passing them on to households and firms.
In countries like Hungary the majority of home mortgages and even car loans are
denominated in Swiss francs and euros. The idea that households would be cautious
about incurring foreign currency liabilities because the exchange rate was floating within
a band turned out to be naïve. The same can be said of the idea that a floating won would
prevent Korean banks from incurring large foreign currency exposures.
In this instance the problem is not a lack of instruments but a reluctance to apply
them. In some cases the need is for more vigorous regulation of the banking and
financial system—no more pretending that when banks pass on their mismatches to
the nonbank sector the problem has gone away. In others it means getting serious
about exchange-rate flexibility so that firms and households appreciate the risks of
foreign-currency obligations. Here too many governments have talked the talk but
not walked the walk. The IMF’s classification of de facto exchange rate regimes
(Bubula and Otker-Robe 2002, as updated by the authors) confirms that there has
been some movement in the direction of more flexible exchange rate regimes and
away from crisis prone intermediate arrangements: the share of emerging markets
with intermediate regimes was down to 41% in 2006, from 77% in 1996. But 41% is
far from a negligible fraction. Moreover, this movement away from intermediate
regimes has halted in recent years. Flexible exchange rates are no panacea, but recent
experience from Estonia to Latvia suggests that regimes of limited flexibility can
contribute dangerously to the build-up of vulnerabilities.
A final agenda item in the earlier round of architecture discussions was enhancing
the capacity of the International Monetary Fund and allied institutions to anticipate
and manage crises. As part of the effort to better anticipate risks, surveillance of
national and international financial systems was strengthened. At the national level
there were the aforementioned Financial Sector Assessment Programs. At the
international level there was the creation in the Fund of a Capital Markets
Department and biannual presentation to the board of a Global Financial Stability
Report. In 2006 there was a Multilateral Consultations Initiative to bring together a
handful of systemically significant members in order to better anticipate and head off
cross-border risks. There was also investment in constructing forecasting models and
early-warning indicators of potential crises.
These too are works in progress. The Fund’s capital markets function has been
hamstrung by the difficulty of competing for talent with high-flying private
institutions.18 Energy has been dissipated on daily reports to management on events
occurring overnight in financial markets.
The idea that the IMF should strengthen its early-warning systems is back on the
table; it features prominently in Gordon Brown’s proposal for reforming the global
financial architecture.19 The experience of the last 10 years does not give one much
confidence in the success of this enterprise. Given the speed with which financial
structures change, legitimate questions can be asked about whether forecasting
models based on historical data can provide reliable early warnings of impending
18 A positive consequence of the credit crisis in the U.S. and Europe, insofar as it puts a damper on the
expansion of the financial-services industry, may be to relax this constraint.
19 See Reuters (2008).
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crises.20 To be sure, there have been cases where crises could be foretold, Argentina
in 2001 being an example.21 In this instance the problem for the Fund was not
anticipating the crisis but flagging the need for corrective policies in a way that did
not precipitate the very disruptions that it was seeking to avert. It was compelling a
member, even one that depended on Washington, D.C. for financial assistance, to
take corrective action.22 It was finding a way of curtailing its assistance without
provoking an economic and financial meltdown.23
The intervening decade also saw proposals for the IMF to act more like a true
lender of last resort (Fischer 1999).24 This idea drew inspiration from the creditor-
panic interpretation of the Asian crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998), according to which
liquidity disbursed quickly in large amounts could have prevented the region’s
fundamentally-sound economies from succumbing to liquidity crisis. But empower-
ing the Fund to disburse large amounts of money subject to only light conditionality
was never viable; this would have put too much discretion in the hands of semi-
anonymous technocrats who would have been the sole adjudicators of what were
crises of solvency and what where crises of liquidity. The Meltzer Commission
(International Financial Institution Advisory Commission 2000) proposed limiting
the ability of the IMF to disburse front-loaded assistance to prequalified countries,
where soundness of the banking system was the principal criterion determining
prequalification.
22 This problem was even more acute in the case of the Multilateral Consultations Initiative, participants in
which were unlikely to borrow from the Fund. Thus the first such consultation, in which the Fund brought
together the United States, Japan, China, the euro area and Saudi Arabia to discuss risks to financial
stability posed by global imbalances, did not suffer from shortcomings of diagnosis but did nothing to
compel the participants to take corrective action.
23 The decision of the IMF, with U.S. Treasury backing, to lend additional resources to Argentina as late
as August 2001 is indicative of the dilemma. The Argentine episode, like the Mexican and Asian crises
before it, also raised concerns that international rescues were a source of moral hazard—that multilateral
“bailouts” did as much to encourage risky behavior as to address its consequences. It pointed to the need
for a more orderly way of resolving crises, if only so that the IMF might, on occasion, be able to stand
back and let events take their course. Suggestions here included an international bankruptcy regime, an
IMF-directed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and the addition of collective-action clauses to
sovereign debt contracts. The idea of an international bankruptcy regime went back at least to Raffer
(1990) and Sachs (1995). Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) summarize the intellectual history. Krueger
(2001) is associated with the proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. Proposals for
promoting the adoption of collective action clauses include Macmillan (1995) and Eichengreen and Portes
(1996) and were promoted by the U.S. Treasury during John Taylor’s stint there. It is not surprising that
schemes for a full-blown international bankruptcy court came to naught; neither creditors nor debtors were
willing to trade an imperfect but workable system for the uncertainty of radical reform. Even a Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism, under which only select decisions regarding debt resolution would have
been made by an independent panel, under IMF aegis, proved a bridge too far. The response ultimately
agreed was the more widespread use of collective action clauses by emerging markets, starting with
Mexico in 2003. How much difference these contractual provisions will make is yet to be seen, the new
arrangements not having been tested yet by a major emerging market crisis.
24 An earlier call to this effect was Sachs (1995).
21 Four years of economic stagnation, soaring unemployment, real overvaluation, a heavy debt load and
complete lack of monetary flexibility being incontrovertible leading indicators in this particular case.
20 There is also the problem of Type 2 error—of warning of (and therefore) precipitating crises that would
not otherwise occur. I am on record as questioning whether the Fund can succeed at developing effective
early-warning system (Eichengreen 2002).
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The problem with this proposal, which did not go unappreciated at the time, was
that banking-sector soundness was not the only or even for that matter the most
important determinant of economic and financial stability; the view that it was had
been heavily informed by the Asian crisis and by the priors of the members of the
Meltzer Committee. There was also the danger that application might send an
adverse signal about the state of a country’s finances (since it would be signaling its
potential need for funds), and that disqualifying a previously prequalified country (as
necessary when its policies deteriorated) could precipitate the very crisis of
confidence that the facility was designed to prevent.25
The idea that the Fund should be transformed into a true lender of last resort that
provides unlimited liquidity without conditions is back on the table as a result of the
current crisis (Sachs 2008). On October 29th, 2008 the Fund announced the creation of
a new front-loaded, quick-disbursing, essentially unconditioned lending facility (the
Short-Term Liquidity Facility, or SLF) for countries with strong policies experiencing
liquidity problems as a result of the credit crisis. This jettisoned the problematic focus
on banking-sector stability of the Meltzer Report, replacing it with general language
to the effect that qualifying countries would have to display “a good track record of
sound policies.” It abandoned the unworkable idea of prequalification. And it avoided
the adverse signaling problem in that every country, almost regardless of its policies,
has suffered from the crisis and would benefit from access to dollar liquidity.
All this said, there has hardly been a mad rush to sign up. And this was still far
from a true lender-of-last-resort facility in that disbursements were limited to five
times the recipient country’s quota.26 There is also the danger that countries denied
access to the facility because of large current account deficits or for other reasons
will suffer capital flight as a result of that fact. This has led some, e.g. Dervis (2008),
to suggest that access to the facility should be expanded—that additional countries
should be provided with large amounts of front-loaded liquidity. Such proposals
however come with an acknowledgment that liquidity support will have conditions
attached. If so, we are likely, ultimately, to be back in a world where every country’s
eligibility for IMF assistance will have to be judged on its individual merits, with
either light, heavy or no conditions attached.
A final issue in the earlier round of architecture discussions was IMF governance.
Asian countries came away from their crisis believing that the Fund was inadequately
responsive to their needs and excessively influenced by the United States. The threat
that they might opt for a regional alternative was motivation for governance reform.27
A governance structure that enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the IMF was seen
25 Awatered-down facility along these lines, the Contingent Credit Line (CCL), was establish in 1999, but
no country applied, and the facility was allowed to lapse in 2003. During the tenure of Rodrigo de Rato as
managing director, the Fund then sought to establisher a successor facility, the Reserve Augmentation Line
(RAL). Unlike some other elements of de Rato’s “Medium Term Strategy” for reforming the Fund, this
one died a quick death.
26 The IMF itself provided no details on the size of the facility, although the Wall Street Journal (29
October 2008) referred to up to $100 billion of three-month loans. At the time of writing, total free IMF
resources are roughly $200 billion, while five times quota for emerging markets as a group approaches
$700 billion. So it would be reassuring to address the Fund’s financial-resource constraint.
27 The Japanese government had proposed an Asian Monetary Fund during the earlier crisis, but this was
torpedoed by the active opposition of the United States and the reluctance of China to participate.
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as important for the credibility of its advice. And a more efficient governance
structure was seen as necessary for streamlining its decision making.
The subsequent process focused on adjusting quotas and voting shares. Proposals
for new quota formulas were tabled, starting with those of the Cooper Committee in
2000, but there was no agreement on a formula. This is not surprising given that the
quota formula has multiple functions. Quotas determine countries’ financial
contributions to the Fund. They determine how much they can borrow. Along with
the fixed number of basic votes bestowed on every member, they determine how
many votes each member is entitled to cast when strategic decisions and amend-
ments to the Articles of Agreement are considered. They thus shape the voice that
different countries have in the deliberations of the institution.
At the Bank-Fund meetings in Singapore in 2006 it was decided to push ahead
with ad hoc quota increases for four under-represented emerging markets, China,
South Korea, Turkey and Mexico, and to impose a two-year deadline on
deliberations leading to a more comprehensive revision.28 This approach did not
please countries that were not so favored such as India and Brazil. Nor did this stop-
gap lend legitimacy to the quota-revision process. The more comprehensive
agreement was announced in early 2008 in time for the spring Bank-Fund meetings
and approved by members holding the requisite 85% of votes in the Fund. It
increased the number of basic votes, modestly enhancing the voice of small
countries. It provided additional budget and resources to the two Executive Directors
representing large numbers of African countries and therefore with especially heavy
workloads. It specified a new quota formula whose arguments included a weighted
average of GDP at market prices and GDP at purchasing power parity (where the
latter favored poorer countries) as well as measures of the level and variability of a
country’s international transactions.
But the new quota formula is no more analytically defensible than its
predecessors.29 In addition the changes in quota shares resulting from application
of the formula are too small to change anything consequential. The voting shares of
Germany and Italy decline from pre-Singapore levels by a miniscule 0.16 and 0.08%
of total votes, respectively. China’s increase is 0.88%. India and Brazil receive
increases of 0.42 and 0.30%. Mexico receives an increase of 0.27%. It is hard to see
how such marginal changes will substantially affect decision making, more so
insofar as most operational decisions are reached in the Executive Board on the basis
of consensus, not votes.
28 The United States agreed not to seek or accept an increase in its quota as part of that subsequent
revision. One reason for the failure to adopt the quota-reform proposals of the Cooper Committee had
been that almost any formula placing a significant weight on GDP at market exchange rates would have
represented an increase in U.S. representation and a reduction in that of developing countries.
29 It is hard to mount a coherent defense of the use of GDP at purchasing power parity. The IMF exists to
lend to and represent the interests of countries according to their weight in the international system. What
matters from this point of view is the market value of their transactions, which points to the use of market
exchange rates; purchasing power parity adjustments are designed to facilitate international comparisons
of living standards, not the market value of transactions. The use of purchasing power parity weights thus
smacks of political expediency. And the fact that further ad hoc adjustments were applied, overriding
mechanical implementation of the quota formula, before submitting the agreement to a vote does not
enhance the legitimacy of the process. These changes were designed to prevent the voting shares of the
high income countries as a group from rising further and those of low income countries from falling.
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Thus, emerging markets continue to feel that they lack adequate voice and
representation in the IMF. The result is that the Fund lacks legitimacy. This is
evident in the reluctance of emerging markets to seek the assistance of the
institution. Pakistan went first to its neighbor China for assistance. Hungary resorted
initially to the European Central Bank (despite not being a member of the euro area)
rather than appealing to the Fund.
3 Changes in the international financial architecture not anticipated in 1999
Ten years on is also an appropriate time to note changes in the international financial
architecture that were not anticipated during the earlier debate. Examples already
have been noted: these include the tendency for capital to flow “uphill” from
developing to developed economies, the accumulation of reserves, and the
emergence of sovereign wealth funds.30
These unanticipated developments are all aspects of the same phenomenon. The shift
from current account deficit to surplus in the developing world reflects a decision by
governments and central banks, in the wake of disruptive crises, to run their economies
under less pressure of demand.31 The result was a decline in investment relative to
saving in emerging East Asia in particular (Rajan 2006, Asian Development Bank
2007). Sustaining those surpluses meant limiting currency appreciation, in turn
implying intervention and reserve accumulation. To the extent that reserves also
constituted a firewall protecting the economy from financial volatility, this was part and
parcel of reducing the risk of financial instability. With the Federal Reserve doing all in
its power to propel the U.S. economy out of its 2000–1 recession and the U.S. more
generally adopting an attitude of benign neglect toward its current account, the result
was uphill flows of capital and global imbalances on a scale not witnessed previously.32
Nor was the emergence of sovereign wealth funds unrelated.33 With their
accumulation of foreign assets it was inevitable that emerging markets would seek to
30 Careful observers of emerging markets will have noted exceptions to the statement about crises, such as
the banking crisis in the Dominican Republic in 2003, currency crashes in Indonesia and Thailand in 2005
and 2006, and a number of debt restructurings. But these were exceptions to the rule, and none had
systemic significance or matched Asia in 1998 for its intensity.
31 And thereby to reduce the risk of financial instability.
32 Chronic U.S. deficits were, in fact, nothing new, but their scale has been unprecedented in recent years.
And, previously, with developing countries importing capital, finance for the U.S. deficit had come
primarily from other advanced economies.
33 The rapid growth and rising prominence of these funds was certainly not something that was widely
anticipated in the late 1990s. In contrast, there was already widespread awareness of the emergence of the
other so-called “new power brokers” (to quote the McKinsey 2007 survey of the same name), namely
hedge funds and other highly-leveraged institutional investors. One strand of the architecture debate
emphasized the need to regulate hedge funds and limit the threat they posed to financial stability (De
Brouwer 2001). My own view (Eichengreen and Mathieson et al. 1998) was the footloose and chameleon-
like character of hedge funds made them exceptionally difficult to regulate; I am not surprised that the last
10 years has seen little progress in this direction. Moreover, it has always been my view that there is
nothing fundamentally different between hedge funds and other highly-leveraged investors, including
investment banks and broker-dealers. It is tempting to see the subprime crisis, which has seen both hedge
funds and investment banks (like Bear Stearns) fail as a result of having engaged in many of the same
practices, as validation of this point.
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diversify their holdings, not just across countries and currencies but to include equity
as well as debt. Deciding on equity stakes was not an appropriate task for central
bank portfolio managers; it was logically delegated to self-standing sovereign wealth
funds and outsourced to private investment advisors.
These funds have been the subject of codes of conduct and standards for
transparency to reassure the countries that were the targets of their investment that
strictly commercial, as opposed to political, criteria would prevail.34 But it is not
clear that we should be concerned that sovereign funds will in fact be used to
advance political agendas rather than simply to diversify the government’s foreign
investment portfolio. What is clear is that this problem would not have arisen but for
the dedication of emerging markets to the maintenance of current account surpluses
and undervalued exchange rates and the willingness of the United States to entertain
large deficits. Having depended on emerging markets to finance its current account
deficits, it is more than a bit disingenuous for the United States to now object to its
lenders’ desire to hold assets other than depreciating U.S. debt securities.
How many of these changes in the international financial architecture should be
regarded as permanent, and how many are likely to be passing phases? The debate
over Bretton Woods II is precisely a debate over whether this particular constellation
is likely to endure or whether it might come to an early and abrupt end.35 The most
compelling argument for the Bretton Woods II proposition that the current
constellation of exchange rates and imbalances could endure indefinitely was that
the U.S. had a comparative advantage in producing financial assets while emerging
markets had a comparative advantage in producing manufactures (Caballero et al.
2006). Emerging markets lacked the technology to reliably develop and issue
securitized claims in the volume demanded by their investors; they solved this
problem by running current account surpluses and importing securities from the
United States.
This rationale is more than a little suspect in the wake of U.S. credit crisis; it is
now described as “they sell us toxic toys and we sell them toxic securities.” The
crisis has cast doubt on the ability of the United States to supply high quality
financial assets to the rest of the world. As the U.S. economy lurches into recession
and foreign purchases of its financial securities decline, global imbalances show
clear signs of unwinding. And if the U.S. deficit shrinks, so too will the surpluses of
other countries, as a matter of definition. By implication, their accumulation of
foreign reserves will slow. Indeed, the heyday of sovereign wealth funds may
already be over, as countries from South Korea to the United Arab Emirates draw on
their reserves to stabilize their exchange rates and recapitalize their banking systems.
34 The IMF has become the main vehicle for negotiation of a code of conduct for sovereign funds—not
without pushback from the governments operating those funds. In February 2008 the European
Commission indicated that it would craft its own code for sovereign wealth funds active in Europe. In
May the U.S. Treasury bilaterally negotiated an agreement on a list of basic principles for sovereign
wealth fund conduct with Singapore and Abu Dhabi.
35 Bretton Woods II is the name given to the thesis of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) that the
constellation of global imbalances was an equilibrium phenomenon that was indefinitely sustainable. It is
not to be confused with calls for a new Bretton Woods from the likes of Gordon Brown (see above). Of
course, there is an irony in the fact that both camps employ the same terminology.
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4 Systemic issues
The rating agencies are targets of criticism in every crisis if only because they are
bearers of bad news and their pronouncements inevitably make a bad situation
worse. But the criticisms levied against them in Asia in 1998 now resonate more
strongly in Europe and the United States. Ratings are lagging rather than leading
indicators. The rating agencies persist in issuing upgrades even after a market or
economy shows clear signs of problems. They then issue downgrades only after
conditions have deteriorated. This positive-feedback behavior amplified volatility in
Asia in 1997–8, and it similarly amplified volatility during the subprime crisis. We
see this again in the failure of the rating agencies to recognize the vulnerability of
countries with large current account deficits.
In part this problem reflects the inability of the agencies’ models to forecast out of
sample. They are estimated on short time series. Just as the agencies rated emerging-
market debt in the 1990s on the basis of only a few years of data on the operation of
sovereign bond markets, they rated subprime-mortgage-backed securities using only
the short time series generated by an enormous housing boom.36 Their best
forecasters are continually hired away by the banks, which pay higher salaries. Then
there is the conflict of interest between the agencies’ advising and rating roles.
Asked by an issuer of collateralized debt obligations how to structure an instrument
so as to obtain an AAA rating, it can be impossible for the agencies to rate the
resulting issue any other way.37
One way of addressing this conflict would be to bar agencies issuing ratings from
also advising issuers. But it is not clear how to do this without at the same time
creating other problems.38 The major rating agencies currently earn fees from
advising issuers on how to structure their securities but not from issuing ratings,
which are public information. One small U.S. rating agency, Egan-Jones, earns
income by providing its ratings only to paying clients. The problem with more
widespread adoption of this model is that public information would become private.
Companies would have to charge for their ratings. The information provided by the
latter would then be less freely available. It is not clear that ratings could be used by
regulators whose operations require a certain degree of transparency.
Another approach would be to levy a tax on every security issuer and/or trader
and use the revenues to compensate those issuing the ratings, which could then
36 In addition there is the problem that the model is estimated on a different structure from the one that
currently prevails in the market. In the case of housing-related securities, the agencies adopted a
methodology long used to model and rate corporate bonds, which are subject to a very different set of
risks. Emerging market corporations that were subject to the so-called sovereign ceiling (where their
ratings could not exceed those obtained by the sovereign) complained of similar practices.
37 There do not appear to be such widespread complaints by investors that the rating agencies, which also
consult with governments, that pay to have their bonds rated, have conflicts of interest in the sovereign-
rating context. Why not is an interesting question.
38 New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo has pressed the rating agencies to agree to a fee
structure in which they charge for services all through the issuance process to prevent issuers from
shopping for ratings. Securities and Exchange Commission head Christopher Cox, for his part, has
proposed a bar on allowing the same employee from both advising the issuer and rating his security. But
whether assigning these two functions to the occupants of neighboring cubicles would really make much
of a difference is unclear.
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remain public. But it is not obvious how such a scheme could be administered. What
private rating companies would qualify for redistribution? What public or semi-
public entity would decide on their shares? Would non-U.S. issuers and investors be
subject to the tax? Would it have to be levied and administered on a global basis?
Just posing these questions casts doubt on the viability of such schemes.39
Alternatively it has been suggested that agencies providing advice on how to
structure an issue could be required to keep skin in the game. They could be required
to hold a certain amount of the same security in their own portfolios to ameliorate
potential conflicts of interest between the financial-and investment-advisor func-
tions. But where the application of such regulation to a commercial bank or even
investment bank would be straightforward, how to apply it to rating agencies would
be less so.40 It would require a fundamental transformation of the function of those
agencies from modestly capitalized advisors to generously capitalized financial
institutions.
Another approach would be to encourage competition. If investors and issuers
had more rating agencies to turn to, those that repeatedly got it wrong would lose
market share and ultimately franchise. Promoting competition is first and foremost a
problem in the United States, where Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch
dominate the market. This reflects the need for a rating agency to secure Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) status in order to be a viable
competitor. NRSRO status allows fiduciaries who pick a bond that goes bad to
defend themselves against legal or regulatory sanction: they can say “an NRSRO
recognized by the SEC told us these securities were good.” Agencies without this
status have an extra handicap when competing for business.41
The Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006 is intended to increase competition by
making it easier to obtain preferred status from SEC staff. So far this has led to the
granting of NRSRO status to exactly one additional rating agency, the above-
mentioned Egan-Jones, in December 2007.42 It may also be possible to address the
problem by encouraging more rating agencies in other countries. There has been
movement in this direction: following the 1997–8 crisis a number of Asian countries
promoted the establishment of local rating agencies. There is now an Association of
Credit Rating Agencies in Asia with 25 members at last report.
The question is why these entities have not taken more market share from the Big
Three. It could be that economies of scale and scope dominate the advantages of
local knowledge. But, if so, it is not clear that more competition is a feasible solution
to the inefficiency of the rating process.
39 Again, shades of the Tobin tax.
40 Even for commercial and investment banks, the efficacy of this reform, advocated in Europe, can be
questioned. In fact many investment banks held large numbers of the securities they originated on their
own balance sheets, whether for warehousing or proprietary trading purposes. They ended up suffering
serious credit losses as a result, but this did not deter them from originating highly risky securities.
41 Dizard (2008) observes that prior to the granting of NRSRO status in the 1970s there was a greater
tendency for investors to shop around for the most accurate rating—since there was no anointed rating
agency that guaranteed them protection from legal and regulatory action—and in this earlier world there
was a greater incentive for rating agencies to derive their fee income from investor rather than issuers.
42 After 11 years of trying by the company’s principals.
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These observations are more troubling insofar as credit ratings are used to gauge
the riskiness of assets under the Basel II capital accord for banks that do not possess
internal models through which value at risk can be estimated.43 Insofar as ratings are
an unreliable measure of the riskiness of an asset class, they provide unreliable
guidance on the size of the capital buffer needed to guard against price fluctuations.
They also accentuate the procyclicality of the financial system. Insofar as ratings rise
(fall) in expansions (contractions), they reduce (increase) the capital that banks must
hold against their existing assets, allowing for the further procyclical expansion
(contraction) of the balance sheet.
Similar criticisms can be registered about the use of internal models of value at
risk as a basis for assessing the adequacy of capital buffers under Basel II. These
models chronically underestimate the likelihood of extreme events. Like the rating
agencies’ models, the banks’ models were developed in a period of low volatility.
Given encouragement from management to minimize costs, staff estimating and
running these models feel pressure to underestimate risks so as to avoid inflating
capital requirements. The operation of these models also accentuates the procycli-
cality of credit. During expansions, highly-leveraged issuers perform relatively well;
their debts are therefore modeled as less risky, allowing banks to reduce their capital
buffers and lend more; the inverse then occurs during contractions.
Besides the fact that capital requirements are too low and procyclical, there is the
fundamental problem that they do not apply to the so-called shadow banking system.
The idea that banks should be required to hold a minimum level of capital flowed
from the observation that they were subject to runs (which liquid capital helped them
to pay out) and that in extremis they should be the recipients of last resort lending
(where requiring them to hold capital was one way of preventing them from taking
additional risk in response to the associated moral hazard). The problem now is that
nonbanks are similarly exposed to the danger of a run, through the money market
rather than from depositors, and they are similarly too important to be allowed to
fail.
These problems are easier to point to than to solve. Abolishing capital
requirements and instead requiring banks to issue subordinated debt places more
faith in the power of market discipline than most of us would feel comfortable with
in the wake of the recent crisis. Going back to Basel I, where different assets were
placed into different risk buckets carrying different amounts of required capital,
would throw away valuable information about value at risk conveyed by the
correlation between asset classes which provided much of the impetus for moving to
Basel II. Abandoning risk weighting entirely and basing capital requirements on
unweighted assets, as some have suggested, would be equally bad.
My own suggestion would run as follows.44 Start by clamping down on
regulatory arbitrage. The fundamental reason for the rise of conduits and structured
investment vehicles was to evade capital requirements. Like banks, these entities
funded themselves short term, by issuing asset-backed commercial paper or securing
a revolving credit line from the parent, while making illiquid investments. But
because their operations were off the bank’s balance sheet, capital did not have to be
43 For more on these internal models see below.
44 Laid out in more detail in Eichengreen (2008).
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held against those investments. Often, however, those investments came with a
guarantee that the parent or the issuing bank would take them back if the market in
them collapsed. Even where this was not the case, the fact that these subsidiaries
were related to the parent often meant that it was too embarrassing to allow them to
fail. Unavoidably, then, these off-balance sheet operations came back onto the
banks’ balance sheets at the worst possible time. For these reasons, the logic for
requiring capital to be held against these operations is overwhelming. The
experience of Spain, where regulators have already done so, demonstrates its
feasibility.
Next, build in some redundancy. In the spirit of the U.S. Alternative Minimum
Tax it should be possible to compute a bank’s minimum required capital in a couple
of different ways and hold it to the higher value. One would be the Basel II value
that requires a bank to consolidate its portfolio (effectively, to move its off-balance-
sheet exposures back onto its balance sheet) and calibrate the associated capital
requirement using its internal model or commercial credit ratings. Another would be
a simplified Basel I value, that requires the bank to simply hold capital that equals
some fixed fraction of its portfolio. The old Basel I procedure could be simplified by
eliminating the old process of risk weighting.45
Then raise the minimum capital ratio under this old “Basel I pillar” to more than
8%. There are compelling reasons to require banks to hold more capital. The risk of
extreme events, against which capital is supposed to provide a cushion, is clearly
greater than regulators and bank risk officers had convinced themselves. More
capital will mean more own funds at risk, which will encourage more prudent
behavior. More capital will of course also mean higher intermediation costs. But
intermediation costs have fallen significantly in recent years as a result of financial
innovation.46 Accepting slightly higher costs in return for significantly greater
stability would not be an undesirable tradeoff.
Finally, index the capital ratio to the rate of change of bank balance sheets.47
When balance sheets are expanding, the capital ratio—as opposed to the simple
amount of capital that banks must hold—should increase. This would restrain the
rate of growth of bank lending in good times and, conversely, limit the contraction
needed to build capital in bad times. The tendency for the present system of capital
requirements to accentuate procyclical financial dynamics would thereby be
attenuated.
5 Implications for debate
What inheritances will be handed down from the first (post-1997) round of
architecture discussions to the new debate over how to reform the international
financial architecture that will follow the 2008 credit crisis? The 2008 crisis
reinforces arguments for enhancing the transparency of financial instruments and
45 The Swiss National Bank has recently proposed something along these lines for banks under its
regulatory jurisdiction.
46 Not least the types of securitization that are also at the root of the present crisis.
47 As argued by Goodhart and Presaud (2008).
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markets. The opacity of collateralized debt obligations and the ease with which
banks disguised exposures by moving them off balance sheet were significant factors
in the crisis. At the same time, that experience underscores doubts that transparency
in and of itself will be enough to prevent excesses and ensure that market discipline
is applied before serious vulnerabilities are allowed to build up. The idea that well-
informed investors, supported by adequate transparency standards, will be able to
discipline large institutional investors and thereby prevent significant vulnerabilities
from building up has shown to be naive. Insofar the problem is not just the
availability of information but also the capacity of investors to process it (even
sophisticated institutional investors appear to have been unable to fully assimilate the
available information about the risk characteristics of complex instruments),
transparency alone is not enough.48
In addition there is the need for strengthened supervision and regulation—another
inheritance from the earlier architecture debate that will be a higher priority in light
of recent events. There will be discussion of regulations limiting investment in
complex derivative securities to sophisticated investors (as recommended by the
Corrigan Committee).49 There will be reforms of Basel II to require internationally
active banks to hold more capital, to key their capital to the riskiness of not just their
investments but also their funding, and to make capital requirements less procyclical,
as described above. There will be reform of the credit-rating industry. All these are
issues that featured to some extent in the earlier architecture literature that will again
be priorities in future discussions.
One issue that did not feature in the earlier architecture debate but which will
surely be the subject of extensive discussion this time is the desirability of forcing
transactions in credit default swaps and other derivative instruments into clearing-
houses and an organized exchange.50 Counterparty risk was not a prominent factor
in the Asian crisis.51 But it is central to why the failure of Lehman Brothers ramified
into a systemic crisis in 1998. When one large financial firm was unable to execute
its obligations, several of its counterparties quickly found themselves in the same
position. In turn, the problems of each of these counterparties created a problem for
several of their respective counterparties, and ultimately the whole house of cards
tumbled down. This problem can be ameliorated by reorganizing the market in credit
default swaps and similar instruments so that transactions are netted through a
central clearinghouse or traded on an exchange with real-time gross settlement.
Such reforms will be resisted by broker-dealers who earn commissions on over-
the-counter transactions. There will also be resistance on the grounds that exchange-
based trading will require the standardization of instruments. It will limit scope for
tailor contracts to individual circumstances. But the political leverage of large
financial institutions has been diminished by the crisis. And greater standardization
is an acceptable price to pay for financial stability.
48 But then most contributors to the earlier architecture debate never suggested that transparency was a
sufficient condition for financial stability.
49 See Counterparty Risk Management Group III (2008).
50 An early and influential statement of the case is Cecchetti (2007).
51 Although it did figure in the failure of Long-Term Capital Management that followed in 1998.
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There also be more discussion of the need for a global financial regulator or
“World Financial Authority” along the lines suggested by Eatwell and Taylor (2000).
Questions will be raised about the appropriateness of delegating the supervision and
regulation of financial markets to individual countries, given the extent to which
problems in one country can infect others. In cases like Switzerland, where short-
term bank liabilities are two-and-a-half times GNP, questions will extend to the
notion that the national authorities are the appropriate entity to deal with rescue and
recapitalization operations. No doubt the IMF, the BIS and the Financial Stability
Forum will all scramble to lay claim to the mantle of World Financial Authority.
But if the first round of architecture discussions teaches us one thing, it is that
countries are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty. They will be reluctant to
delegate the regulation of national financial institutions and markets to any
supranational authority. Notwithstanding the creation of the Asian Bond Fund and
Asian Bond Market Initiative, there was no willingness to do so in Asia. EU member
states have been reluctant to embrace the case for a single financial regulator for
their single market. It would not be surprising if the current wave of enthusiasm for a
World Financial Authority dies down as soon as the worst of the crisis has passed.
This is not to deny that there will be renewed efforts to strengthen, harmonize and
coordinate supervision and regulation through the Basel Committee of Bank
Supervisors and the Financial Stability Forum. Europe being the only part of the
world with experience in creating supranational institutions, it may rethink its
reluctance to move in the direction of a single regulator for the euro area or the EU
as a whole.52 If one wishes to imagine more far-reaching scenarios, the least
implausible is the creation of a new international body or empowerment of an
existing one to issue directives for how national markets should be regulated, which
would then be enacted into law by individual countries (much in manner that the
European Commission’s directives are enacted by EU member states).53 This could
be made an obligation of countries joining the “World Financial Organization” in the
same way that legislation providing freedom of access to foreign suppliers is an
obligation of members of the World Trade Organization. Countries that did not adopt
the relevant legislation would then see their banks denied access to foreign markets
and financial instruments issued on their markets denied eligibility for the portfolios
of foreign pension funds, insurance companies and the like.
Another focus of the next round of discussions, like their predecessors, will be
IMF reform. This is implicit in the fact that many of those calling for a new
international financial architecture refer to the need for a new Bretton Woods
Agreement, the original Bretton Woods Conference being where the IMF was
established. The IMF’s inability to say anything critical about its large members is a
weakness in the architecture. The Fund was notable for its silence when the U.S.
Treasury rolled out a flawed bank rescue plan in September 2008 that emphasized
purchases of troubled assets at something resembling market prices rather than
capital injections—this despite the fact that the Fund had extensive experience with
the resolution of banking crises and had published definitive analyses of the issue
(Laeven and Valencia 2008). The inadequate voice and representation of emerging
52 Although, as we know from long experience, institutional evolution in Europe doesn’t occur quickly.
53 Something along these lines has been suggested by Phillips (2008).
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markets, which renders them reluctant to approach the organization until it is too
late, creates unnecessary vulnerabilities. The inability of the Fund to move quickly in
response to unfolding events is a significant liability.
Meaningful reform requires changing the composition of the Management and
Executive Board responsible for priorities and policies. A 24 member Executive
Board is unwieldy; national central banks typically make decisions in a considerably
smaller board.54 Corporations rely for oversight on a board of directors with
considerably fewer than 24 members and an even smaller executive committee. The
current board is also unrepresentative. That there are as many as nine European
Executive Directors (depending on whether or not Spain is in the chair of its mainly
Latin American constituency) is an anachronistic inheritance from the mid-20th
century when decolonialization had not run its course.55 Finally, the current board is
poorly structured, with regional neighbors scattered between different constituencies,
former imperial powers and their one-time colonies grouped together in constitu-
encies, and other countries assembled into groupings whose composition simply
defies logic.
An appropriate response would be to downsize the board to streamline decision
making, to change its composition to better reflect the realities of the 21st century,
and to rationalize the constituency system. Doing so will hinge on the willingness of
the European Union to consolidate its representation (initially almost certainty into
two seats, one for the euro area and one for the remaining EU countries).
Consolidated European representation has been on the agenda for some time. It
has been advocated by both officials (Bini-Smaghi 2004) and academics (Ahearn
and Eichengreen 2007). It is now being pushed by the European Commission (EC
2008) in the face of resistance from EU member states that anticipate losing their
position at the board table.56
Meaningful governance reform also requires changing a leadership selection
process that allows the Europeans to nominate the managing director and the U.S. to
select his first deputy.57 This anachronism reflects the era long past when the
Americans and Europeans could take global leadership for granted. It diminishes the
legitimacy of the institution. Other regions have increasingly objected to this
convention, but with the Europeans and Americans supporting one another in the
Bank and the Fund it is hard to overcome their blocking coalition. Because there is
little scope for candidates to compete on their merits, there is little assurance that the
most qualified will be selected. Reform of leadership selection has been on the
agenda for some time (Kahler 2001), but there has been little progress. Each time
the managing directorship opens up, there is a promise to open up the process a bit
“the next time around.” Here the failure of the United States to open up the selection
54 The ECB is an exception, but with the expansion of the euro area it too plans to move to a rotation
system to limit board size.
55 Included in this encompassing list is Switzerland, which is not an EU member (relevant for the
discussion below).
56 Not all European states; some such as the Dutch have come out cautiously for consolidated
representation.
57 And the U.S. to designate the president of the World Bank.
From the Asian crisis to the global credit crisis 19
of the World Bank president so as to pressure the Europeans to offer the same
concession at the Fund was an opportunity missed.
There are in addition far-reaching schemes for reforming IMF governance, such
as making directors independent in the manner of a central bank board (DeGregorio
et al. 1999) or turning over their central responsibilities to nonresident directors—
that is, to finance ministry and central bank deputies who would travel to
headquarters periodically (King 2006). There has been a tendency to dismiss these
ideas as unrealistic. Now that there is a new appreciation of the need for the Fund to
be able to tell hard truths about even its largest shareholders, perhaps these ideas will
come back on the table.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, calls for a “new Bretton Woods”
notwithstanding, the result of future discussions is not likely to be a new global system
of fixed exchange rates. There have been some peculiar suggestions that the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods System is the ultimate cause of the 2008 credit crisis, the
implication being that the world should now go back to fixed rates.58 In fact the
opposite implication follows. Had emerging markets maintained more flexible dollar
exchange rates for the last five years, global imbalances, notably between the United
States and the emerging world, would not have been allowed to balloon to the same
extent. Less foreign finance for the U.S. deficit would have meant less accommodating
U.S. financial conditions, moderating the credit boom in the United States.59 Calls for
a new Bretton Woods Conference to strengthen the regulation of global financial
markets are welcome. But the idea that this might translate into a new Bretton Woods
System of pegged exchange rates is not.
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